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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of power but rather a satisfaction on the part of the legislatures that hospitals
are being ,carefully and properly managed and that there is no need for state
regulation. The hospitals themselves, by organizing into associations and by
grading the hospitals according to set standards, have regulated themselves and
raised the standard of quality and service far more than any legislative act
could possibly do.
SISTER M. ANN JOACHIM, O.P.t
THE EFFECT OF MECHANIC'S LIENS ON THE REVERSIONARY
INTEREST OF LANDLORDS*
The improvement of leased real property at the instance of a tenant frequently
gives rise to knotty problems involving the liability for the cost of repairs.
The unpaid contractor receives certain rights in the realty in addition to his
right to a money judgment against the tenant for the cost of the work and
materials. Under the various forms of mechanic's lien statutes in effect in
this country, the contractor is given the right to file a lien against the tenant's
interest in the property, and, under proper circumstances, against the reversionary
interest of the landlord as well. The tenant who orders the work is clearly
bound. Passing this question of contractual liability, the advent of mechanic's
liens as supplementary protection for the contractor making repairs on leased
property presents several vexatious problems. Shall the landlord who is a
step removed from the contractor also be bound? It is his land which is
improved. If the tenant in ordering the work is complying with his lessor's
prescription, it is clear that the reversionary interest is bound under all types
of statutes herein discussed, despite their differences in form. But suppose the
landlord has not sought the improvement. Is he to be improved out of his
freehold? The improvement may not, in his eyes, improve. It may be
singularly inappropriate-an idiosyncrasy of the tenant. It may be a unique
structure or a specialty building designed for the particular use of the tenant
and of no functional utility otherwise. A ducal chateau erected in a slum
district adds no value to the land. It depresses the value by the cost of its
removal.
It should be borne in mind in these cases that the tenant ordering the work
is liable to the contractor in personam for the cost, and that his leasehold
interest may be bound in rem by the lien. The landlord, consenting to or
acquiring the work, is never liable in personamr for the cost unless he has agreed
to contribute thereto.' This distinction may not be of importance if the
owner's equity is substantial, for as a practical matter, he will not permit its
foreclosure. Today, however, the average property, through depression of
t Admitted to practice before United States Supreme Court.
*Acknowledgement is made to Milton R. Friedman of the New York Bar for helpful
suggestions in the preparation of this paper.
1. Weinheimer v. Hutzler, 234 App. Div. 566, 256 N. Y. Supp. 7 (4th Dep't 1932):
see Brigham v. Young, 241 N. Y. 435, 439, 150 N. E. 207, 208 (1926).
[Vol. 8
COMMENTS
value, is mortgaged to the hilt and the distinction is one of practical importance.
But if the owner's equity is slim, the value of a short term leasehold is more so.
Succession to the leasehold estate, through foreclosure of the lien, gives a
successor, principally, the privilege of paying rent. But it may have a nuisance
value in compelling payment through threatened disruption of the tenant's
business. When filing against the tenant (usually for whatever it is worth),
the temptation is to include the owner's greater reversionary interest if there
is any likelihood of its being effective.
If the improvement, alteration, or repairs are ordered directly by the landlord,
there is no problem. He has consented thereto and is liable both in personam
and in rem. Hence this comment considers chiefly the circumstances under
which a mechanic's lien may be extended to the lessor's interest in real property
following a contract for improvements or repairs nominally made with the
lessee of said real property. We may pass, then, the admitted liability of the
lessee under the mechanic's lien to the extent of the lessee's interest in the
property.2 This liability arises, since within the definition of both of our lien
law3 and judicial construction,4 the lessee is an owner of the leased premises
and as an owner his promise will subject his interest as security. This interest
of the lessee in comparison with the value of the improvements made is usually
negligible. Logically, therefore, the lienor observing the diminution of the
value of his security, attempts to bind the owner or owners in fee.6
No comprehensive study of the types of mechanic's liens would be complete
without a brief historical survey. Although at Civil Law, mechanic's liens were
both recognized 6 and clearly regulated7 they were extended protection neither
2. Xnapp v. Brown, 45 N. Y. 207 (1871); see Cornell v. Barney, 94 N. Y. 394, 399
(188).
3. N. Y. L= LAw (1932) § 2 (owner includes an owner in fee of real property, or of
a less estate, a lessee for a term of years, a vendee in possession under a, contract for the
purchase, and all persons having any right, title, or interest in such property, which
may be sold under an execution).
4. Benjamin v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 517, 26 N. W. 725 (1886) (owner of any estate or
interest in the building which the court may order sold); Searman v. Paddock, 51 Mo.
App. 465 (1883) (in Missouri, the one sought to be charged need not have any interest
in the buildings so long as the improvements are for his benefit); Ombony v. Jones, 19
N. Y. 234 (1859), aff'g 21 Barb. 520 (N. Y. 1855) (a tenant at will); Lang v. Everling,
3 Mlisc. 530, 23 N. Y. Supp. 329 (Common Pleas 1893) (a life tenant); Eno v. Rapp,
169 Mlisc. 473, N. Y. S. (2d) 513 (Sup. CL 1938) [a foreclosure receiver is not an owner
under N. Y. Lim LAw (1932) § 2].
5. The action not being against real property but against the interest of an owner, Is,
therefore, often brought against several owners to the extent of the interest of each.
6. 1 STRAmm, DosAT's Crvm LAw (2d ed. 1850) §§ 1741, 1742, 1744.
7. Hunma, I-moDuc'xoN To Rom"er LAw (4th ed. 1921) 68-70; 1 SntnA.u , op. cit.
supra note 6, § 1741 (gives to 6ne who has laid out money for the preservation or repair
of property the privilege of considering the property his own to the extent of the sum
expended thereon); 1 STnAmur, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1742 (gives to one who hasadvanced
money for the improvement of an estate the same privilege upon the said improvements as
upon a purchase made with his money, which privilege referred to in 1 Sra~ms,, op. cit.
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at common law8 nor in equity.9 The first of these laws, established by 1905 in
every state in the Union,' 0 owe their origin to the desire to establish and improve
as speedily as possible the city of Washington, Maryland."
Insufficiency of the Common Law Lien
The New York artisans' lien on personal property 2 is declaratory of the
artisans' common law lien for work done on personalty. 1 This common law
lien, applicable only to personal property and with its requirement for con-
tinuous possession by the lienor, failed to aid the mechanic. 14 A mechanic
who put his labor or materials into a building which he was constructing or
improving, necessarily lost possession of those articles which through annexa-
tion became permanently affixed to the freehold and were converted from
personalty into realty.' 5 This labor or material having become an intrinsic,
irremovable part of the realty, it was incumbent upon the state legislatures to
supra note 6, § 1739 is a right to follow the article, if it be an immovable delivered before
payment, wherever it may have passed); 1 STrmAAN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1744 (gives
to architects and other undertakers, workmen, and artificers who bestow their labor on
buildings or other works, and who furnish materials and in general all those who employ
their time, their labor, their care, or furnish any materials whether it be to make a
thing, or to repair it, or to preserve it, the same privilege for their salaries and for what
they furnish, as it gives to those who have advanced money for these kinds of works
and which the seller has for the price of the thing sold) ; France: CODE NAPOLEoN (1804)
Privileges and Mortgages, § 2 art. 2103 (an interesting outgrowth of the Civil Law is the
provision in the CODE NAPOLEON in France according liens to masons, architects, contractors,
and others employed in building houses).
8. Shaw v. Young, 87 Me. 271, 32 At. 897 (1895); see Birmingham v. Glen, 78 N. Y.
30, 32 (1879).
9. See Withrow v. Glascow, 101 Fed. 863, 865 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900); Ward v. Yarnelle,
173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910).
10. See Armour v. Western Constr. Co., 36 Wash. 529, 538, 78 Pac. 1106, 1110 (1905).
11. See Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Indianapolis Ry. Co., 179 Ind. 356, 369, 101
N. E. 296, 301 (1913) (the law was adopted in the year 1791, and although confined at
first to towns and cities, it was slowly extended, in a majority of the states, to agricultural
districts).
12. N. Y. LIEN LAw (1932) § 180.
13. Smith v. O'Brien, 46 Misc. 325, 94 N. Y. Supp. 673 (Sup. Ct. 1905), afl'd, 103
App. Div. 596, 92 N. Y. Supp. 1146 (1st Dep't 1905).
14. Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485 (N. Y. 1842); Hilton Lumber Co. v. Murray, 47 App.
Div. 289, 62 N. Y. Supp. 35 (2d Dep't 1900) (a building remains real property despite any
agreement with the owner of the land upon which it stands as to the right of removal);
see Sweet v. James, 2 R. I. 270, 278 (1852) (mechanic's lien statutes are designed to secure
to mechanics the same lien upon real estate as the common law secured to artisans upon
personal property manufactured or repaired by them in their workshops).
15. WALsH, THE LAW Or REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1934) §§ 37-50, contains an invaluable
treatment dealing with the articles which by their very nature can be termed fixtures, and
the degree of annexation required to convert personalty into realty. See also Friedman.
THE SCOPE OF MORTGAGE Lzx.s oq FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY IN NEW YORK (1938)
7 FoRDAr L. REv. 331, 333.
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afford these mechanics, contractors, laborers, skilled and unskilled, some type
of security beyond the personal liability of the owner. It was hoped that a
charge against the improved property would adequately protect the mechanics."'
This charge against the improved property became the mechanic's lien. How-
ever, the nature of the improvement, labor, structure, or degree of annexation
for which a lien could be impressed, varied due to the diversity of statutes and
statutory constructions in the different states,' 7 and is at present completely
dependent upon the particular statute under which the lien is being claimed.
In New York, the desire for affording greater security for mechanics cul-
minated in the passage of the state-wide1 8 Lien Law of 1885.0 A mechanic's
lien, as the title of the statute implies, is a particular20 rather than a general
lien.21 It is neither property,- nor a right to property,3 but is simply a right
to charge property affected, with the payment of a particular debt2 4 to which
it is incident. This right is conferred upon a particular class of persons, namely,
contractors, sub-contractors, laborers, or materialmen who perform labor or
16. See Goodman v. Baerlocker, 88 Wis. 287, 292, 60 N. W. 415, 416 (1894) (it was
further hoped that such legislation would result in a resurgence of the building industry
culminating in the growth of large cities).
17. See Cary Hardware Co. v. McCarty, 10 Colo. App. 200, 203, 50 Pac. 744, 749
(1897) ; See also notes 31-41 infra.
18. Early New York mechanic's lien statutes applied only to buildings improved in
New York City. N. Y. Laws 1851, c. 573, § 6; N. Y. Lans 1863, c. 11, § 6; N. Y. Laws
1869, c. 558; N. Y. Laws 1873, c. 489; N. Y. Laws 1873, c. 233. These city lien laws were
more limited in their scope. They not only enumerated those persons who would be
entitled to a lien, but also specified the type of improvement or realty to be affected by
their labor or materials.
19. N. Y. Laws 1885, c. 342.
20. Van Stone v. Stilwell & Bieice Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128 (1891); Otis Elevator Co.
v. Finks Clothing Co., 131 'Ae. 95, 159 At. 563 (1932); Mochon v. Sullivan, 1 Mont. 470
(1872); First National Bank of Boris v. Lyan Gray Lumber Co., 194 S. W. 1146 (Civ.
App. Tem. 1917) ; Cain v. Rea, 159 Va. 446, 166 S. E. 478 (1932).
Cases amplifying further the particular nature of a mechanic's lien are Lichtenstein v.
Grossman Construction Co., 248 N. Y. 390, 162 N. E. 292 (1928) (holding that a lien on
several buildings is good as to each, only to the extent of work and materials going into
each) and Leske v. Wolf, 154 App. Div. 233, 138 N. Y. Supp. 859 [2d Dep't 1912])
(holding that a lien filed on two buildings, separately owned, is void).
21. See Freeman v. Cram, 3 N. Y. 305, 309 (1850).
22. Sorsby v. Woodlawn Lumber Co., 202 Ala. 566, 81 So. 68 (1919). (Holds to the
line of thought that a mechanic's lien is not property, due to the fact that it is merely
a right which must be pursued, and if not promptly pursued is lost.) But Ece N. Y. L=.r
LAw (1929) §§ 14, 13 by virtue of which a mechanic's lien is "ignable and i5 treated
generally like property.
23. Wiley v. Connelly, 179 Mass. 360, 60 N. E. 784 (1901); See v. Kolodny, 227 1.ass.
446, 116 N. E. 888 (1917). Contra: Carter v. Humboldt Fire Ins. Co., 12 Iowa 287
(1861), which holds that a lien is an interest in property. -,
24. Sorsby v. Woodlawn Lumber Co., 202 Ala. 566, 81 So. 63 (1919); Alberti v.
Moore, 20 Okla. 78, 93 Pac. 543 (1908).
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furnish materials for the permanent improvement of real property.25 The lien
is based ,n the grounds of equity, 20 natural justice, 27 and necessity.28
Broadly speaking, there appear to be three types of statutes. °  First,
statutes based on direct contract. Secondly, statutes requiring notice.80
Thirdly, statutes based on consent. It should be added here, however, that
these variances are significant only in the application of problems arising
in the absence of any direct contractual relationship between the lien claimant
and the owner of the fee. Procedural differences among the states and difficul-
ties arising out of contractural relations between the lienor and the lessor-
owner of the fee-shall be for the most part omitted.
Statutes Based on Direct Contract
First, there are those statutes which permit the lessor to be subject to the
mechanic's lien only when the material has been furnished through a contract
with the lessor or his agent.3' In these jurisdictions, the lessor is often bound
25. The lien at first was designated to secure only the principal contractor until thefrauds perpetrated upon subcontractors and workmen gave rise to the need of amendments
for their proper protection. See Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Indianapolis RN.
Co., 179 Ind. 356, 369, 101 N. E. 296, 301 (1913).
26. Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910); Houston Lumber Co. v. Hunt,96 Kan. 778, 153 Pac. 554 (1915); Feuchtenberger v. Williamson, 137 Va. 578, 120 S. E.
257 (1923).
27. See Darling v. Gould, 83 Me. 134, 137, 21 Atl. 833, 834 (1890); Mochon v. Sullivan,
I Mont. 470, 472 (1872); Lamb v. Goldfield Lucky Boy Mining Co., 37 Nev. 9, 15. 138
Pac. 902, 904 (1914).
28. Mochon v. Sullivan, I Mont. 470 (1872).
29. Contra: Note (1929) 28 Mica. L. REv. 321, in which it is offered that there are
two types of mechanic's liens, those based on contract and those dependent on consent with
the owner.
30. The author herein submits this added type separately despite the fact that it isincidental to and usually used in conjunction with either one of the accepted two classes.
It is deserving of special and separate classification because of the absolute statutory
change resulting from the mere addition of a notice clause.
31. ALA. CODE A;NY. (Michie, 1928) § 8832 (under or by virtue of any contract with
the owner or his agent); ARK. Dic. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927) § 6906(under or by virtue of any contract with the owner or proprietor hereof, or his agent,trustee, contractor, or sub-contractor); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1935) § 1183(whether at the instance of the owner, or of any person acting by his authority, or underhim, as contractor or otherwise) ; IOWA CODE (1935) § 10271 (by virtue of any contract
with the owner, his agent, trustee, contractor, or sub-contractor); KAN. GEN,. STAT.(Corrick, 1935) c. 60 (under a contract with the owner of any tract or piece of land. or
with trustee, agent, husband or wife of such owner); LA. CONST. & STAT. (Wolff, 1920)§ 1703 (under or by virtue of any contract written or verbal with the owner of any tract.
parcel, or piece of land, or agent of such owner) ; Miss. CODE AmN. (1930) § 2259 (person
must be employed or under contract with the owner). This latter statute is comparatively
severe, providing in § 2260 that if the work is done at the instance of a tenant or another
not the owner of the land, only the house, building, structure, or fixture, and not the
estate of the tenant or such other person, in the land, shall be subject to such lien. unle-
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by his lessee's acts on the ground of agency, deduced not from the lessor-
lessee relationship, but from another source, namely, any act or contract upon
the part of the landlord which amounts to the establishment of the power of
agent in the tenant. If the lessor obligates or binds the tenant to build or
construct permanent and substantial improvements beneficial to the reversionary
interest of the landlord, the person furnishing any part of the material or work
for said specified improvements under or by virtue of a contract with said
tenant, has the right to a mechanic's lien against the reversionary interest of
the landlord in the land improved. This is on the theory that the tenant, under
just such circumstances, becomes an agent of the owner within the contempla-
tion of the mechanic's lien statutes.32 It is evident that the agency theory is
stretched to constitute the lessee a special agent of the lessor3
Naturally no question arises where the contract is directly with the owner,
as there the bare question of his liability is undeniable. Similarly, a contract
to furnish materials to one who has a direct contract with the owner con-
clusively satisfies the agency requirement in the statute. Under this rule, a
lessee directly contracting with his lessor to make specific improvements binds
the lessor. This direct contract may be supplied by the court as an inference
from the lease. It has been held that even express provisions in the lease,
stipulating that the lessee was not an agent to bind the lessor and that con-
tractors were to look solely to the lessee's interest in the premises, were insuffi-
dent to free the lessor's interest from liability, when the lessee was required
to make improvements of substantial benefit to the reversion. The court based
its holding on the fact that such a requirement, in effect, constituted the lessee
the agent of the lessor.35
the same be done by written consent of the owner); Mo. Rnv. SrTA. (1929) § 3156
(under or by virtue of any contract with the owner or proprietor thereof, or by his
agent, trustee, contractor or sub-contractor); Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3160 provides for
liens on leased property; NEs. Co-,". STAT. (1929) § 52-101 (by virtue of a contract or
agreement, expressed or implied with the owner thereof or his agents); N. H. Pun. LAws
(1926) § 217-12 (by virtue of a contract with the owner thereof).
32. See Jordan v. Natrona Lumber Co., 52 Wyo. 393, 399, 75 P. (2d) 378, 382 (1938).
In New Hampshire the statute requires a notice to the owner when the contract is made
with an agent, rather than with the owner. N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) § 217-15.
33. It is interesting to note that under the strict rules of agency (Mfcn=, OuTrrM'z
or AGm-cy [3d ed. 1923] §§ 458, 465) the lessor could be sued on the basis of personal
liability. But it is submitted correctly in Note (1929) 28 Mici. L. R ,. 321, 323, that
the strict rules of agency are not honored. The author suggests that for the purpose of
the lien laws he be called simply a statutory agent. Were the agent contemplated in N. H.
PUB. LAws (1926) § 217-15 deemed to bind the owner by the contract as if made by the
owner himself, then a contract with the agent would fall within N. H. Pun. LAws (1926)
§ 217-12 as if made with the owner.
34. ARx. D]G. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927) § 6906 (contract with trustee,
contractor, or sub-contractor is sufficient if each has a direct contract with the owner.)
35. Allen Estate v. Boeke, 300 Mo. 575, 254 S. W. 858 (1923); Mo. Rsv. STA'T. (1929)
§§ 3156, 3160.
1939]
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Statutes Requiring Notice
A second type of statute makes the lienor's rights dependent upon some
mode of notice, either on the part of the lienor to the lessor in order to bindthe latter, or a statutory notice by the lessor to the lienor in order to divest
himself of liability.
States which require a direct contract with the lessor or his agent attempt toalleviate the hardships on the sub-contractor caused by the comparative severity
of such statutes. They provide that when a lessor with whom a lienor hasnot entered into direct contractual relation, is given notice that certain ma-terials are being furnished for improvements undertaken on his premises, heis subject to a lien on receiving such notice, if he fails to disclaim responsibility.30This liability of the lessor appears to be based on a form of third party responsi-bility by estoppel. New Hampshire, however, adds a restriction to the rights
of lienors by requiring that if the contract is made with an agent, contractor, or
sub-contractor of the owner, the lienor must, before performing the labor offurnishing the material for which a lien may be claimed, give notice in writingto the owner or to the person having charge of the property, that he intendsto claim such a lien.87 This statute in effect estops the contractor from showing
a contract, unless he can clearly establish reliance which encouraged him to goforward with the contract.
The second broad form of notice, namely by the lessor to the lienor, is a writ-ten, statutory notice of non-responsibility, posted in some conspicuous place onthe property in addition to a verified copy filed for record. Both notices must begiven within a certain number of days after knowledge comes to the lessor 8that improvements on his property are being made by one other than himself
or his duly authorized agent.39 The exact number of days granted for such
notice varies according to the jurisdiction from five to ten days. 40
Statutes Based on Consent
The third class of statutes, in order to bind the lessor for acts of the lessee.
requires merely the establishment of the lessor's consent that improvementsbe made. Of this group, the New York statute is typical. The section under
discussion reads:
"A contractor, sub-contractor, laborer or material-man, who performs labor orfurnishes materials for the improvement of real property with the consent or
36. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 8832; N. H. Pui. LAWS (1926) § 217-15.
37. N. H. PUB. LAws (1926) § 217-15.
38. CAL,. CODE Cirv. PROC. (Deering, 1935) § 1183.39. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1935) § 1192 (to be filed in the office of the county
recorder of the said county in which the property or some part thereof is situated).40. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1935) § 1192 (ten days); NEv. Co.zp. L,\ws(I-illyer, 1929) §§ 3735, 3743 (where the improvements are made without contract withthe owner, or at his instance, they are deemed to have been made at the instance of theowner, unless within three days after he obtained knowledge of the work he posts a notice
and within five days makes a statutory notice of non-responsibility).
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at the request of the owner thereof, or of his agent, contractor or sub-contractor,
shall have a lien for the principal and interest of the value, or the agreed price,
of such labor or materials upon the real property improved or to be improved
and upon such improvement, from the time of filing a notice of such lien as
prescribed in this chapter." 41
The Equitable Basis of the Statute
The legislature did not intend to subject the lessor to a lien for improvements
indiscriminately made upon his land by a lessee. The statute was based upon
the equitable principle that only one who knowingly takes the benefit of the
property or labor of another in the form of improvements made upon his land
ought to be burdened with a lien on his realty for the value thereof. The
use of the general and unmodified word "consent" has resulted in much litiga-
tion and consequent judicial interpretation and clarification of the focal term.
The Problem Presented
As early as 1902 the vital problem confronting the courts was the interpre-
tation of the word "consent". The judges were most careful to note the inability
of the landlord to prevent the erection of new buildings on previously vacant
property.4 For such improvements, legally permissible and bare of any form
of affirmance by the lessor, it is obviously inequitable to charge the lessor. Yet
a lessor has been charged for the improvements ordered by his lessee in certain
situations wherein the consent imposed by law was not actually granted. A
major problem confronting the lessor is his failure to recognize his possible
responsibility even for the unauthorized acts of his tenants under leases in-
expertly drafted. Granted that the specific improvements enhance the value
of the lessor's property, yet it is submitted that such improvements undertaken
by the lessee may be neither intended nor contemplated by the lessor.
41. N. Y. L= LAW (1932) § 3.
42. Husted v. Mathas, 77 N. Y. 388 (1879); Burkitt v. Harper, 79 N. Y. 273 (1879);
Otis v. Dodd, 90 N. Y. 336 (1882); Rice v. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60, 64 N. E. 761 (1902);
Schaghticoke Powder Co. v. G. & J. Co., 183 N. Y. 306, 76 N. E. 153 (1905) (considered that
the contractor was deemed to have acquired an interest in the improved property to the
extent of the value of his labor); Fischer v. Jordan, 54 App. Div. 621, 66 N. Y. Supp.
286 (2d Dep't 1900); McNulty Bros. v. Offerman, 141 App. Div. 730, 126 N. Y. Supp.
755 (2d Dep't 1910); Nellis v. Bellinger, 6 Hun 560 (N. Y. 1876); Wahle-PhIllips Co.
v. Fitzgerald, 83 Misc. 636, 146 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
43. Rice v. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60, 64 N. E. 761 (1902); Lehmeyer v. Moses, 69 Misc.
476, 127 N. Y. Supp. 253 (City Ct. 1910); cf. McDonald v. O'Hara, 117 Misc. 517, 192
N. Y. Supp. 545 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (this case illustrates the unwillingness of the Nt% York
courts to recognize the rights of the tenant to alter or improve existing structures without
the consent of the lessor) ; Winship v. Pitts, 3 Paige 259 (N. Y. 1832); see also (1938) 7
FoRD.As L. REv. 140 which discusses the change in the N. Y. Rrr. Prop. Liw which
permits improvements and alterations by either a life tenant or tenant for years, prpviding
he complies with the statutory requirements embraced in N. Y. RAL Pnop. LAw (1937)
§ 537.
1939]
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How Consent May Be Given Expressly
The tourts have decisively determined that the consent required to satisfythe lien law may be either express or implied 44 from the conduct of the ownerindicating willingness that improvements be made, or approval on his part
of the means adopted for the purpose. With few exceptions, the terms or
omissions of the lease, after circumspect perusal by the court, supply the
requisite consent.
Consent may be given directly to the lienor by an express contract with thelessor or the lessee acting as the lessor's agent. This consent binds either orboth of them directly. This situation is comparatively simple and for ourpurposes can be eliminated. Usually the lienor, however, seeks to bind thelessor indirectly, under a contract made only with the lessee. Lacking direct
contract with the lessor, the lienor seeks to establish the lessor's consent
through the terms of a lease or of a lease containing an option to purchase or
otherwise. But an agreement in the lease permitting general, unspecified
repairs45 or necessary improvements46 is not consent within the purview of
the statute.4T An example of such an agreement in a lease would be a promise
to "keep the premises in good order and repair during said term.14 8  A rather
extreme case seems to deny a lien on the ground that an agreement thatbuildings be erected on the premises is a contract for general improvements.49
The court justifies its holding by pointing to the absence of specifications andparticulars as to the types of buildings. Thus it appears that an indispensable
condition must be either that the particular repairs be specifically provided forin the lease, or that the owner expressly consent to or request that particular
repairs be made or that with a knowledge of the employment and its purpose,
he acquiesces therein.50 Consent by the lessor to specific improvements does
44. Hankinson v. Valentine, 152 N. Y. 20, 46 N. E. 292 (1897) (lessee promised to make
all repairs); National Wallpaper Co. v. Sire, 163 N. Y. 122, 57 N. E. 293 (1900);
Anerbach v. Alland, 196 N. Y. Supp. 145 (City Ct. 1922); Majestic Tile Co. v. Nicholls,
161 Misc. 231, 291 N. Y. Supp. 551 (County Ct. 1936).
45. Hankinson v. Vantine, 152 N. Y. 20, 46 N. E. 292 (1897) (lessee promised to make
all repairs).
46. Seklir v. Kritzer, 48 Misc. 25, 96 N. Y. Supp. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (lessee, having
rented premises inadequate for his special purposes, promised to put them and keep them
in repair).
47. Conant v. Brackett, 112 Mass. 18 (1873); Rice v. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60, 64 N. E.
761 (1902).
48. See Aetna Elevator Co. v. Deeves, 125 App. Div. 842, 843, 110 N. Y. Supp. 124,
125 (1st Dep't 1908).
49. See Beck v. Catholic University, 172 N. Y. 387, 391, 65 N. E. 204, 205 (1902).50. Burkett v. Harper, 79 N. Y. 273 (1879); Schmalz v. Mead, 125 N. Y. 188, 26N. E. 251 (1891); Hankinson v. Vantine, 152 N. Y. 20, 46 N. E. 292 (1897); De Klyn
v. Gould, 165 N. Y. 282, 59 N. E. 95 (1901) ; Jones v. Menke, 168 N. Y. 61. 60 N. E1053 (1901); Gates v. Natl Fair & Exposition Ass'n, 225 N. Y. 142, 121 N. E. 741 (1919);
N. Y. Elevator Supply Co. v. Bremer, 74 App. Div. 400, 77 N. Y. Supp. 509 (1st Dcp't1902); Aetna Elevator Co. v. Deeves, 125 App. Div. 842, 110 N. Y. Supp. 124 (1st Dep't1908); McNulty Bros. v. Offerman, 152 App. Div. 181, 137 N. Y. Supp. 27 (2d Dep't
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not render his property liable beyond those specified.5 ' A bare consent to a
lessee "that the improvements should be made"52 without knowledge of or a
desire to encumber the realty is not consent within the statute.5 3
Generally, non-compliance with the stipulation in a lease necessitating sub-jection of all improvement plans to the lessor is fatal to recovery by the lienor54
But the fact that the cost of the repairs exceeded the verbal estimate agreed
to by the lessor is not sufficient to negative all the rights of the lienor. is
rights still exist to the extent of the established specific consent.L 53 A stipula-
tion in the lease that the owner is not to be subjected to any mechanic's liens by
the lessee is ineffective as against a mechanic. Only an action by the lessor
against the lessee for breach of contract remains. The basis given for this
ruling is the inability of the mechanic to be forewarned concerning the agree-
ment contained in the lease.50  This argument is questionable.5 7
Expense of Repairs-As An Element of Consent
Another important and oft-deceiving addition to a lease, whereby the lessor
unsuccessfully attempts to eliminate any possibility of his intention to incur
liability, is contained in a manipulation of the specifications as to who is to
bear the expense of the repairs. If the improvements required to be made are
specific and enumnerated, the owner is deemed to have given consent regardless
of whether he has bound himself to pay all of the costs,58 or any part thereofPm
1912) ; Berger Mfg. Co. v. Zebriskie, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1038 (City Ct. 1902) ; Seklir v. Kritzer,
48 Misc. 25, 96 N. Y. Supp. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Jewitt Refrigerator Co. v. Lawless, 120
Misc. 443, 198 N. Y. Supp. 617 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
51. De Klyn v. Gould, 165 N. Y. 282, 59 N. E. 95 (1901); McNullty Bros. v. Offerman,
152 App. Div. 181, 137 N. Y. Supp. 27 (2d Dep't 1912).
52. Landis v. Landis, 243 App. Div. 464, 277 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Ist Dep't 1935).
53. But see National Wallpaper Co. v. Sire, 163 N. Y. 122, 57 N. E. 293 (1900) which
holds the lessor subject to a mechanics lien. The court is influenced by the fact that the
lessor is in possession of valuable improvements for which be has not paid.
54. Hartlett v. Murtha, 36 App. Div. 196, 56 N. Y. Supp. 686 (Ist Dep't 1899);
Mitchell v. Denmore Realty Co., 126 App. Div. 829, 111 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1st Dep't 1903).
55. McNulty Bros. v. Offerman 221 N. Y. 98, 116 N. E. 775 (1917); Boyle v. Paolini
Cafeteria & Restaurant, 220 App. Div. 482, 222 N. Y. Supp. 19 (4th Dep't 1927).
56. McNulty Bros. v. Offerman, 221 N. Y. 98, 116 N. E. 775 (1917) (this construction
by the court is justified on the ground that the provisions of a lease, secret to the mechanic,
should not be binding upon him).
57. Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 619, 25 Pac. 919 (1891); see Hinckley v. Fields' BLcuit
& Cracker Co., 91 Cal. 136, 27 Pac. 594 (1891); Lumber Co. v. Whalley, 162 Cal. 224, 121
Pac. 729 (1912); Allen v. Wilson, 178 Cal. 674, 174 Pac. 661 (1918). But see CAr. Coo
CIV. PROc. (Deering, 1931) § 1192 which eliminates the element of secrecy by providing
the owner with an open statutory method of announcing non-responsibility within ten
days after knowledge of improvements reaches him.
58. McNulty Bros. v. Offerman, 221 N. Y. 98, 116 N. E. 775 (1917) (by contribution).
59. Meistrell v. Baldwin, 144 App. Div. 660, 129 N. Y. Supp. 666 (2d Dep't 1911)
(rebate from rent); see Hall v. Parker, 94 Pa. 109 (18so) (which works out lessors
liability on the theory that if the lessee retains a certain amount of the rent, be becomes
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or has expressly specified that he was to pay none at all.00 Where the consent
is for general improvements, the owner binds himself only if he promises to
pay the whole cost. 61 This broad statement is substantiated by the later
holding in Beck v. Catholic University,2 wherein the court refused relief
against a vendor who consented to general building improvements by the vendee
at his own expense. The holding in Cornell v. Barney 3 states that the owner
of property is subjected to a mechanic's lien for a building constructed on his
land if he promises to pay for it. The court refrained from commenting on
the situation resulting from merely a part payment for the improvement. Con-
sent, however, to bear the expense is a secondary consideration in working out
a statutory consent. The court has gone so far as to refuse a lien although
consent to specific improvements and an agreement to shoulder part of the
expense through a rebate from the rent were present. This was on the ground
that the improvements were solely for the benefit of the tenant. 64
Constraint as an Element of Consent
The courts have been prone to read consent by the lessor into a lease when
either the improvements made were required for keeping the lease alive, or were
made as a consideration in the creation of the lease.0 5 Yet a covenant to make
"necessary repairs", which impliedly means to put into proper condition for
use, was construed to refer only to such repairs as the tenant might find
necessary for his use of the premises, and not to require the tenant to put the
premises in a better condition than they were at the commencement of the
term.66 On the other hand a provision to "renew what plumbing may be
necessary", coupled with the knowledge that the premises were unsuitable for
hotel purposes as leased, without such renewal of the plumbing, does bind the
the lessor's agent). Contra: Regan v. Barst, 11 Misc. 92, 32 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Common
Pleas 1895) (holds that if costs are deducted from the rent, the lessor cannot be held
liable).
60. Tinsley v. Smith, 115 App. Div. 708, 101 N. Y. Supp. 382 (2d Dep't 1906) (lessee
to pay all). Contra: McClintock v. Criswell, 67 Pa. St. 183 (1870) (although specific
improvements are called for, if coupled with stipulation that lessee to pay all, this is
inconsistent with the consent to the performance of the work on the credit of the building).
61. Cornell v. Barney, 94 N. Y. 394 (1884) (owner agreed to pay for the construction
of three buildings on his property).
62. Beck v. Catholic University, 172 N. Y. 387, 65 N. E. 204 (1902) (the holding in
this case has never been disapproved although it seems definitely unsound). The court
treats the consent given to erect buildings as a consent to make general improvementh
Is it not possible that such improvements are specific in nature, despite the fact that
specific construction plans are not discussed?)
63. Cornell v. Barney, 94 N. Y. 394 (1884).
64. Schuldt v. Chuckrow, 222 App. Div. 441, 226 N. Y. Supp. 220 (2d Dep't 1928)
(the building although renovated was suitable merely for the purposes of the lessee; it
was necessary for the lessor to re-renovate in order to facilitate leasing).
65. Jones v. Menke, 168 N. Y. 61, 60 N. E. 1053 (1901) (the lease was to be null and
void if premises were not fully fitted up within three months to suit the lessee's business).
66. White v. Albany Railway, 17 Hun 98 (N. Y. 1879).
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lessor. 67 Apparently, the presence of an element of force exercised by the
lessor often provides the reason for the fine distinction which the court draws
between seemingly contrary holdings.0 8
Consent - Given Impliedly
Consent may also be given impliedly through conduct at times, when ordi-
narily neither the written nor oral lease alone would bind the lessorPc The
conduct from which the court will imply consent is varied.
Acquiescence
A mere passive acquiescence in the erection, or alteration, with the knowledge
of the lessor, is not sufficient evidence to spell out the consent necessary to
satisfy the statute. A requirement by the lessor that the future lessee submit
his building plans as a condition for the execution of the lease is not such a
passive acquiescence and not creative of lessor's liability to the lienor. The
court has construed it as primarily an act for the protection of the lessor's
premises and not such an affirmative acquiescence as is called for in the statuteY°
The court illustrates the difference between passive and affirmative acquiescence
by distinguishing National Wallpaper Co. v. Sire7' from Sunshine v. Morgan.72
The former case furnishes the affirmative nature of the acquiescence required,
in that the owner knew that the lessee expected him to bear part of the expenses,
and with that knowledge acquiesced in and repeatedly admired the repairs.
In Sunshine v. Morgan, however, the lessor merely examined and assented to
the improvement plans contemplated by the lessee in order to satisfy himself
that his property would not be damaged.
An interesting factual set-up presents itself when the lessor or owner is
present, knows of, acquiesces in, and fails to object to or stop the work pro-
gressing on leased premises. These acts will not subject his interests to a lien
67. See Wilson's Plumbing Shop on Wheels v. Dartmouth College, 168 Mis 376, 379,
6 N. Y. S. (2d) 671, 672 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (the court carefully points out that plaintiff
failed to show that the plumbing installed was in any way unnecessary).
68. Nason Ice Machine Co. v. Upham, 26 App. Div. 420, 50 N. Y. Supp. 197 (2d
Dep't 1898). (the court found an element of force supplied by the lessor in forbidding the
lessee to sublease to any but an ice company, knowing that the premises were not adapted
for that purpose without improvements and alterations); see Jordan v. Natrona Lumber
Co, 52 Wyo. 393, 399, 75 P. (2d) 378, 382 (1938) (the court stated that where the tenant
is obligated to make improvements, the lessor need not agree to pay the cost, as in such
a situation, in legal effect, the landlord is taken to have agreed to payment).
69. See National Wallpaper Co. v. Sire, 163 N. Y. 122, 131, 57 N. E. 293, 297 (1900);
Majestic Tile Co. v. Nicholls, 161 Misc. 231, 237, 291 N. Y. Supp. 551, 552 (County CL
1936).
70. See Delany v. Duvoli, 278 N. Y. 328, 331, 16 N. E. (2d) 352, 355 (1938); Sunshine
v. Morgan, 39 Misc. 778, 780, 81 N. Y. Supp. 278, 280 (App. Term 1902).
71. National Wallpaper Co. v. Sire, 163 N. Y. 122, 57 N. E. 293 (1900).
72. See Sunshine v. Morgan, 39 Misc. 778, 780, 81 N. Y. Supp. 278, 280 (App, Term
1902); Rice v. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60, 65, 64 N. E. 761, 762 (1902) (also distinguished be.
tween passive acquiescense and consent).
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"unless the work was obligatory, or he has exercised supervision, authority or
control 73
Silence as Consent
The question of silence as consent usually arises when a lessor-lessee rela-
tionship does not exist. Can the owner's silence in such a situation spell out
his consent? Ordinarily, a trespasser cannot, by a contract with a mechanic,
bind a silent owner.74 The owner is not under an affirmative duty either to
speak or to oust the mechanic so employed. 75  The court by way of dictum,
without specific elucidation, does bind an owner in fee for acts of a trespasser
when "he [the owner] is in some way connected with the contract, or has given
his consent to the expenditure in such a manner as to bind him within the
recognized principles of equity." 76  It can, however, safely be said that mere
silence will never bind an owner in fee for the acts of a trespasser. This is
for the reason that the court has impressed the mechanic with the duty "to
inquire and to assure himself of the fact that the person with whom he contem-
plates making the contract, or for those whose benefit he is about to employ
labor or materials, has in fact such an estate or interest in the land as will
enable the mechanic to assert a statutory lien."7 7  The mechanic, placed in a
position wherein he cannot assert that a trespasser has such an interest, must fail.
Yet the silence of an owner in fee of an empty lot, who stands by and
willingly permits his son to contract for improvements on the land, is sufficient
to subject the land to a lien. The father's ignorance of the liability he might
be incurring is summarily dismissed by the court. The saving grace, although
the court makes no special mention of it, appears to be the fact that the son
is construed to be a tenant at will rather than a trespasser.7 8 A tenant at will
is an "owner" within the purview of the statute.79 Being an owner, he has
"such an estate or interest in the land" 80 as the mechanic is under the duty to
discover, in order to subject him to a lien.
Another familiar set of facts is presented when a wife owns property for
which her husband orders improvements. The court holds that when a wife,
knowing of the improvements, stands by and receives the benefits willingly,
her silence will spell out the requisite consent.8' This duty of the wife to
speak has been translated into law by an amendment to Section 3 of the New
York Lien Law reading:
73. See Smith v. Vera, 136 Misc. 500, 502, 241 N. Y. Supp. 202, 203 (County Ct. 1930).
74. Lowry v. Woolsey, 83 Hun 257, 31 N. Y. Supp. 1101 (1894), aff'd, 146 N. Y. 375.
41 N. E. 89 (1895).
75. Spruck v. McRoberts, 139 N. Y. 193, 34 N. E. 896 (1893).
76. Id. at 199, 34 N. E. at 897.
77. Ibid.
78. Nellis v. Bellinger, 6 Hun 560 (N. Y. 1876) (the tenancy at will seems to be wholly
fictitious; the court could just as well have used the relationship of father and son as a
basis for agency or estoppel by conduct).
79. Ombony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234 (1859), aff'g 21 Barb. 520 (1859).
80. See Spruck v. McRoberts, 139 N. Y. 193, 199, 34 N. E. 896, 899 (1893).
81. Husted v. Mathes, 77 N. Y. 388 (1879); Edgerton v. Thomas, 9 N. Y. 40 (183).
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"When the contract for an improvement is made with a husband or wife and
the property belongs to the other or both, the husband or wife contracting
shall be presumed to be the agent of the other, unless such other, having know-
ledge of the improvement, shall, within ten days after learning of the contract
give the contractor written notice of his or her refusal to consent to the
improvements." 8 2
Failure to Act-By Deed or Word
The failure of an owner to eject a contractor as an intruder does not spell
out consent where it is conclusively shown that he has forbidden a continuance
of the work.8 3  In attempting to spell out consent from a failure to act, it is
impliedly necessary for the lienor to establish a power in the lessor to prevent
that which the lienor claims he has failed to prevent.84 The court has further
expanded the proposition that mere acquiescence does not spell out consent,
by adding that even failure to dissent is not consent8 5
Kiowledge
Mere knowledge that work, such as the renewal of a partition wall, is to
be done to make the premises suitable for the purpose rented does not spell
out consent in the absence of other stipulations which might bind the
lessor.88 Even the knowledge and approval of the specific-improvement plans
contemplated do not amount to consent, where the landlord exercises no con-
trol or supervision over the performance of the contract.8 7
Nature of Improvenzent
The New York statute has taken pains to define the term "improvement."
When used in the application of the "consent" clause, it "includes the erection,
alteration, or repair of any structure upon, connected with, or beneath the
surface of, any real property and any work done upon such property or materials
furnished for its permanent improvement, and shall also include any work done
or materials furnished in equipping any such structure with any chandeliers,
brackets or other fixtures or apparatus for supplying gas or electric light and
shall also include the drawing by an architect or engineer, of any plans or
82. N.Y. Laws 1929, c. 515, § 2; N. Y. Laws 1930, c. 859, § 4.
83. Cowen v. Paddock, 137 N. Y. 188, 33 N. E. 154 (1893); Lowry v. Woolsey, 83 Hun
257, 31 N. Y. Supp. 1101 (1894).
84. See Rice v. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60, 66, 64 N. E. 761, 763 (1902).
85. Havens v. West Side Electric Light Co., 17 N. Y. Supp. 580 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
86. Garber v. Spivak, 65 MAisc. 37, 119 N. Y. Supp. 269 (App. Term 1909) (merely
contemplates optional improvements); cf. Wilson's Plumbing Shop on Wheels v. Dart-
mouth College, 168 Misc. 376, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 671 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (deals with necessary
plumbing improvements).
87. De Klyn v. Gould, 165 M. Y. 282, 59 N. E. 95 (1901) (knowledge was followed
by a neutral attitude); Rice v. Culver, 172 N. Y. 60, 64 N. E. 761 (1902) (progress of the
work was complimented); Jones v. Manning, 53 Hun 631, 6 N. Y. Supp. 33g (1898)
(lessor approved building plans).
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specifications which are used in connection with such improvement".8 s It is
therefore necessary to establish the fact that the articles furnished or to be
furnished and the labor performed either repair or improve the realty. The
courts have undertaken to give the words "improvement of real property" a
broad and comprehensive meaning.80 The crucial test of the improvement is
based upon the idea of permanency. 90 Materials which are annexed to the
property for mere temporary enhancement 1 will not provide the basis for the
right to a lien. The qualities which satisfy the requirements necessary to con-
vert personal property into a fixture92 will clearly satisfy the requisite of
permanency, 93 with the important difference that for the assertion of a lien,
the materials need not be annexed to the realty, so long as they have been
manufactured, although undelivered, with a view to such annexation.04
Methods of Avoiding Liability
It is just and equitable that an owner of property be provided with methods
of fairly absolving himself from liability from indiscriminate improvements by
a lessee. The owner may do so in several ways. He may include provisions
in a lease which will insure him against liability for any improvements made,
unless his intent to be bound is clearly shown by other acts. The landlord
may forbid the making of any improvements unless his written consent be
first obtained. 95 Such a requirement for approval of the plans and written
consent would unequivocally eliminate the possibility of improvements being
entered into beyond the means or contrary to the intention of the lessor.
Another preventive method outside the lease is a requirement that the lessee
give an indemnity bond to the lienor against any possible liens against the
88. N. Y. L=EN LAW (1929) § 2.
89. Schultz v. Quereau Co., 210 N. Y. 527, 104 N. E. 621 (1914) (furnishing of oxygen
and acetylene for road improvements are not lienable); Wahle-Phillips Co. v. Fitzgerald.
225 N. Y. 137, 121 N. E. 763 (1919) (the installment of electric lighting fixtures is a
permanent improvement); Goldberg-Roabin Inc. v. 74-2nd Ave. Corp., 252 N. Y. 336,
169 N. E. 405 (1929) (demolition is lienable).
90. See Caldwell v. Glazier, 138 App. Div. 826, 831, 123 N. Y. Supp. 622, 624 (1st Dep't
1910).
91. Id. at 832, 123 N. Y. Supp. at 625.
92. Wahle-Phillips Co. v. Fitzgerald, 225 N. Y. 137, 121 N. E. 763 (1919) (gas and
electric light fixtures are permanent); Sherwin v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks,
148 Misc. 452, 265 N. Y. Supp. 14 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (fixtures for kitchen and restaurant in
a club house); Pike v. Naylon Securities Co., 140 Misc. 734, 251 N. Y. Supp. 659 (Sup.
Ct. 1931) (theatre chairs attached to the floor).
93. Empire City Iron Works v. Margolies, 85 Misc. 238, 148 N. Y. Supp. 348 (City
Ct. 1914). For a thorough discussion of the elements necessary to establish the conversion
of personalty into a fixture, see Friedman, supra note 15.
94. N. Y. Laws 1929 c. 515, § 2.
95. Hartlett v. Murtha, 36 App. Div. 196, 56 N. Y. Supp. 686 (Ist Dep't 1899);
Nutchell v. Denmore Realty Co., 126 App. Div. 829, 111 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1st Dep't 1908).
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property.96 However, the lessor is here beset with practical difficulties in the
obtainment of a surety bond guaranteeing completion of lienable work free
and clear of liens. Generally, today, premiums are high and such bonds are
written only on the deposit of collateral, which takes the place of real estate
as security. The collateral required may be cash collateral, savings bank
accounts, stock certificates and the like. A surety bond is comparatively simple
to obtain by a responsible lessee. However, one in such a circumstance would
not be required by his lessor to obtain a bond, for the simple reason that a
lessee of that type would be sufficiently able to meet the obligations incurred
by a direct contract with all persons entitled by the statute to a lien. The
lessee who is unable to obtain a surety bond is usually the one from whom the
lessor needs protection.
The lessor may require a waiver of all liens from the contractors or material-
men desiring to be engaged in any work to be done or material furnished. A
contractor may waive his rights to a lien by an agreement with the owner not
to file a lien.97  Mechanics or materialmen may waive their rights to a lien
either by a promise not to file a lien when about to erect a building or by
means of a release discharging the building from a lien after work upon it has
commenced.98 In the landlord-tenant tie-up, it is difficult to get complete cov-
erage by waivers without signing subcontracts, "sub-subs," individual laborers,
etc.
Suggested Additions to the N. Y. Law
In the event that the lessor does not protect himself in any of these possible
ways, he may still complain that he did not intend to be bound, although be
knew of the improvements being undertaken on his property, and although
the lease contained clauses which subsequently worked out his "statutory"
consent.9 9 An added provision in the New York Lien Law, such as is supplied
in the California statute o providing for a statutory notice of non-responsibility
from the owner within ten days after knowledge of the improvements comes
to him, would seem to satisfy the lienor's objection to the present laws. Pre-
supposing a natural diligence in respect to his property, the lessor would be
burdened with this duty to disclaim, either when the knowledge did or should
have come to him. The full meaning of the statement of equity underlying
96. Warde v. Nolde, 259 Mlo. 285, 168 S. W. 596 (1914).
97. Shropshire v. Duncan, 25 Neb. 485, 41 N. W. 403 (1889).
98. Long v. Caffrey, 93 Pa. St. 526 (1880). It mu.t be understood, however, that if
the contractor has been paid according to the contract, the "subs" who have been ignored
by him have no right to a lien. Van Cott v. Gallon, 163 Afisc. 914, 298 N. Y. Supp. 67
(County Ct. 1937).
99. Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 271, 279, answers the argument of the hardships of
the owner with the terse statement that although "he may find his property subjected to
a foreclosure sale, yet he has probably benefited by the improvement, and in any event is
in a superior position to the lienor in that he can usually prevent an alteration, to his
property unless the lease or contract of sale calls for it."
100. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1935) § 1192.
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the statute would then be realized. The statute would then truly bind those
who knowingly take the benefit of improvements on their land, for if not
intending to be bound, .it would give them not only the opportunity but the
burden of showing a contrary intention.
INNOCENT PARTICIPANTS IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Copyright is the negative right to prevent the appropriation of the labors of an
author by another. As otherwise expressed, "copyright is merely a special
application of the command, 'Thou shalt not steal!' " However, unlike larceny,
the presence of animus furandi is no essential element to a literary piracy. The
purpose of the copyright act is to secure to authors, composers and other artists
the financial fruits of their intellectual labors. This purpose would be defeated
if defendants were allowed merely to prove lack of guilty intention in order to
escape liability for the infringement of copyright. However, with the advent of
motion pictures, radio, and other scientific developments the mechanics of
copyright infringement have become complicated and require the participation of
many persons. Thus responsibility for infringement, in many cases, can no
longer be traced to one person or a single combination of persons. Of times a
corps of people contribute to a literary piracy without whose combined efforts
the infringement could not have taken place. Thus far, scant attention has been
directed to the question of the extent of liability of innocent persons who
participate in an infringement of copyright.
Introduction
The author of an unpublished work, by the act of reducing the product of his
thought to concrete form as a book, musical score, or other literary composition,
obtains rights in the composition, conceived to be property rights.2 These rights
are essentially rights of exclusion. There vests in the author the exclusive right
to possess, use and dispose of the intellectual production.3 The common law
affords such composition protection which in no great respect differs from that
thrown about any other form of personal property.4 However, the common
1. Zollman, Radio and Copyright (1927) 11 MARQ. L. REV. 146, 147.
2. See Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909); Jewelers'
Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 247, 49 N. E. 872, 873
(1898).
3. DROVE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLEcTUAL PRODUcTiONS (1879) 97. These rights
are incorporeal and exist separate and apart from the property in the paper on which
the composition is written. At common law the intellectual property right may be in one
person while title to the physical thing is in another. Wercbmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co.,
142 Fed. 827 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905), aff'd, 148 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Baker v.
Libbie, 210 Mass. 99, 79 N. E. 109 (1912). See 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 41
(1934). This also is true with regard to the rights granted the author by the Copyright Act,
Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. 528 (U. S. 1852).
4. See Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 608, 614 (U. S. 1871) ; Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v.
Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 247, 49 N. E. 872, 873 (1898).
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